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CHAPTER SIX

Utilitarianism

P

roject Prevention is a non-profit organization that pays drug-addicted women
$300 cash in exchange for sterilization or
long-term birth-control.1 It was formed in
1997 by Barbara Harris, who had adopted
four of the eight children of a California
addict. Her group claims to promote a
social good. Children born to drug addicts
are often neglected or abused; others are
stillborn, have genetic or developmental
defects, or are born addicted and suffer
through withdrawal. Nearly all who survive
require special care—at a public cost of
billions of dollars a year in the US alone.
Beyond increasing public awareness of
the problem, “Project Prevention seeks
to reduce the burden of this social problem on taxpayers, trim down social worker
caseloads, and alleviate from our clients
the burden of having children that will
potentially be taken away.” Moreover,
“Unlike incarceration, Project Prevention
is extremely cost effective and does not
punish the participants.” As of mid-2018,
over 7,000 women have been paid to be
sterilized or given long-term birth control
implants and over 280 men received
vasectomies; these are addicts who earlier
produced a total of about 6,000 living
children who are in foster care or are waiting adoption.
The addict may use the cash for
anything, including getting another fix.
Indeed, the Project has used such slogans
as “Don’t let pregnancy get in the way of
your crack habit.”2 The group does offer
referrals to treatment programs, but does

not fund them. Critics claim the Project
has no concern for the addicts, and that
it targets minorities and the poor. But
although the proportion of Black “clients”
is roughly twice that of the general population, the largest group (about 60%)
is White. Some argue that addicts are
incapable of making such a life-altering
decision rationally; given their addiction,
a cash incentive is seductive at best, coercive at worst. Others claim that our right to
reproduce should not be bargained away,
just as we should not sell ourselves—or be
seduced—into slavery.
Ms. Harris is quoted as saying, “We don’t
allow dogs to breed ... We neuter them. We
try to keep them from having unwanted
puppies, and yet these women are literally having litters of children.” Yet she has
also said: “Some people are so into the
women and their rights to get pregnant
that they seem to forget about the rights
of the kids. They act like these children
don’t matter. People need to realize these
women don’t want to have babies that are
taken away from them.”3
But Mary Barr, a spokesperson for the
National Advocates for Pregnant Women
in the US, says “Today I’m a successful
woman with a house and family ... But
I used to be homeless and addicted to
crack cocaine ... My children are happy
and healthy. My daughter has just started
studying at college to be a doctor, on a
full scholarship. If Project Prevention had
got to me, she wouldn’t exist.”4
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6.1 THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD
Utilitarianism, the focus of this chapter, is the name for a cluster of closely
related ethical theories that embody a distinctive way of thinking about
moral issues and public policy. We may preview aspects of utilitarian thinking in the operations of Project Prevention: the aim to promote a social
good, concern for the welfare of children, the balancing of costs and benefits, and the single-minded focus on results. In this morally provocative
case, the foundation claims the social good is achieved largely by preventing harm: it works to reduce the social and financial burden of unwanted
and often afflicted children born to drug addicts, to prevent the miserable lives such children are likely to have, to discourage the practice of
repeated abortions, and so on. The incentive payment for sterilization is
modest, so the total financial cost is comparatively small, and the addicts
receive money, not punishment; rehabilitation efforts would cost much
more—and they are seldom successful. The addicts are happy to receive
the cash. Yes, they might use the money for another fix; but that would
likely have occurred by other means anyway, and it is greatly outweighed
by the benefits. Moral critics may raise doubts about whether the women
are in a proper state to make such a decision, whether such an incentive
is coercive, whether reproductive rights should be traded, whether the
program targets minorities or disrespects women—but their doubts and
ethical scruples only serve to restrain us from doing what is needed to
prevent harm and make the world a better place. So says the utilitarian.
Utilitarianism, like ethical egoism, is a type of consequentialism.
Consequentialist moral theories, as we have seen, focus on the outcomes
of actions and practices, emphasize instrumental reasoning (the selection of efficient means for given ends), and enjoin us to produce the most
good. The development of economics and the spread of economic models
have made this cost–benefit orientation commonplace in our age. As a
result, for us it is difficult to recapture just how breathtakingly radical
this way of thinking was when utilitarianism was promulgated in nineteenth-century Britain by Jeremy Bentham, James Mill (1773–1836), and his
son John Stuart Mill.5 An account of the intellectual history of this period
in Britain is well beyond our scope; here I can only mention a few motifs
that such an account would include: the spread of democratic and republican models, the promotion of social reform through legislation, debates
over slavery and the slave trade, the awakening of the women’s suffrage
movement, earnest charity, the global extension of colonialism during the
long reign of Queen Victoria, the rise of the social sciences, and faith in
the possibility of social progress. Utilitarianism is deeply embedded in
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all these, being both a reflection of them and an impetus for them. Most
radical theories are striking in what they reject and in the simplicity of
what they propose. In practice, the apparent simplicity usually gives way
to knotty complexities, and theorists need to reclaim and rehabilitate
some of what was first rejected. All this is true for utilitarianism. Let us
begin with its striking simplicity.
One of the problems of moral theory is the relationship between the
right and the good, between what ethics requires of us and the prospect
of gain or loss of the things we value. We have seen the tension that can
arise: Abraham’s Divine Command ethics required him to sacrifice his son,
whom he loved. Firmness in the right (righteousness) overrode concern
for any human desire or common good, or claimed righteousness itself to
be the only good. Consequentialist theories, by contrast, assert a simple,
straightforward connection: what is right is to secure what is good.
Instead of contending with Ten Commandments, ancient and contested
sacred texts, varying cultural norms, multiple and conflicting natural
rights, or other such complexities, consequentialism offers morality a
single principle, a master key that can always and everywhere unlock any
moral dilemma: maximize the good. There is no need to prioritize principles or resolve their conflicts when there is only one valid principle.
The principle that we are morally obligated to promote the good is the
Principle of Utility.
Moreover, ethical theories that make what is right a matter of following age-old rules or commands or human rights impose a kind of harness
or restraint on human action. (This is why Bentham opposed the concept
of natural rights.) They are the moralizing weight of the past. Such rules
keep us in line, but they do not improve the world. They are not progressive. Utilitarianism says in effect, “Throw off the harness of stultifying
morality! Remove the shackles of prior constraints! Look to the future
and consider how what you do might make a difference. Morality is not
a weight; it is a force. Think about what will actually improve lives and
make the world a better place—for that is the true purpose of morality!”
For example, inherited morality, fossilized in Victorian law, may state
that marriage is a life-long sacred union, a contract bound by oaths; that
wives cannot own property or divorce their husbands; that the marriage
must continue even when the relationship is emotionally empty or abusive.
Such a morality enforces misery and improves nothing. The utilitarian
instead directs the moral force toward acts and practices that would make
life better. This attention to outcomes or results gives ethics an empirical cast; the moral agent needs to know about causes and effects, and to
adjust efforts in accord with actual experience.
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To summarize: consequentialism is radical in that: (1) it reduces morality
to a single master principle; (2) it directly links right action to the maximization of the good; (3) it looks to the future and downplays the binding
moral status of rules, codes, rights, and precedent; and (4) it calibrates
actions by experience, by the outcomes achieved, the differences made.

6.2 FROM EGOISM TO UTILITARIANISM
Although consequentialism has only one master principle, the maximization of the good, it requires two specifications or subsidiary principles.
They answer two important questions: “What is the good?” and “Whose
good is to be maximized?”
The philosophical study of value is called axiology. In ethics, it focuses
on the nature of the good (in aesthetics, it includes the study of beauty).
Utilitarians are united in the view that utility is the good. But this generic
term masks subtle differences among them. Early utilitarians, like many
egoists, embraced the view that pleasure is the good. John Stuart Mill, as we
shall see, subtly shifts this concept of utility further, preferring happiness
as the good, though it consists in pleasures. Others prefer the satisfaction
of desire, and economists have tended to use the term welfare synonymously. Later utilitarians often prefer the term well-being.
The second question—“Consequences for whom?”—is a way of asking,
“Who counts, who matters, when one considers the costs and benefits
of an act or practice?” The answer lays down a distributive principle; it
determines the normative way to distribute the good (and any collateral
harm). An ethical egoist counts only herself; her welfare alone matters
in determining what is right. Hobbes, as we saw, professed that model.
Bentham’s keen interest in social reform drew him to a different distributive principle: especially in public issues, he claimed that one should
seek the greatest good for the greatest number. This formulation is now
known as the defining doctrine of utilitarianism. When an act maximizes
the good, producing the best possible total consequences for the greatest number, we call that act optimific. For a utilitarian, only the optimific
act is the morally right act, the action we should take; any other action
would be wrong.
Although Bentham elaborates his views and Mill modifies them significantly, it is prudent to begin with the vanilla version of utilitarianism that
they share:
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“X is right” = “X produces the greatest good for the greatest
number,” or
“X is right” = “X is the optimific act.”

Even this basic formulation displays many attractive aspects, including
those that made it radical: (1) the simplicity of a single principle that harmonizes the right and the good; (2) the focus on the future and objective
results; and (3) the move from morality as constraints on action to morality as a goad for betterment. But there are more. (4) Utilitarianism entails
agent impartiality. Egoism, as I noted, entails an unwarranted partiality:
the egoist counts; others do not. But when one considers “the greatest
number,” each individual counts as one, including the agent. Another
distinguished utilitarian, Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900), put the point this
way: “The good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the
point of view (if I may say so) of the Universe, than the good of any other.”6
(5) This impartiality is also egalitarian, since it not only rejects discrimination among individuals, it implies that all individuals matter; all are
capable and worthy of experiencing the good. (6) Indeed, given the usual
theories of value it embraces, it may actually expand the moral community: any creature that can suffer (that is, experience pain or harm, as well as
pleasure) has moral standing, and their suffering must be registered as a
negative effect of action. The capacity to suffer, wrote Bentham, should
mark “an insuperable line” in how we treat all creatures. An early champion of the moral standing of animals, Bentham asserted: “The question
is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?”7 Finally,
(7) the theory offers a hope and guide for the formation of public policy
and the resolution of ethical conflicts. It directs our moral energies away
from prior commitments, individual differences, and personal prejudices
toward participation in the construction of the collective good, the betterment of our world.

6.3 BENTHAM’S CALCULUS
Jeremy Bentham was an English social reformer and philosopher who
took a law degree but never practiced, preferring instead to direct his
considerable energy to projects for the public good. A child prodigy,
Bentham’s brilliance was edged with eccentricity: for example, before he
died at age 84, he had made extensive preparations for his body’s dissection and its preservation and display as an “auto-icon.”8 As we have seen,
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Bentham was a hedonist and enemy of natural rights. His most important
philosophical statements were presented in his influential 1789 work, An
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, which sets forth his
ethical system. Blessed with family wealth, Bentham pursued wide-ranging
research on topics such as prison design (he designed the “panopticon”9)
and penal code reform, electoral reform, economic theory and fiscal
practice, humane treatment of animals, and refrigeration processes. In a
posthumously published essay, he argued for the liberalization of laws
regarding homosexuality.
The ringing simplicity of Bentham’s “greatest good for the greatest
number” principle quickly encountered complexities. If our only moral
task is to maximize the good, which is pleasure, we need some way to
quantify and measure the pleasure and pain produced, both for a single
individual and for a group.10 Indeed, the measurement must be precise
enough to compare the pleasures and pains of alternative actions, so that
one might identify the optimific act. And the measurement must assign
negative weight, not neutrality, to pain. One must subtract the harm done
from the good achieved to get the net benefit.
Since the process of measurement implies a unit of measurement,
Bentham used the term hedon for a unit of pleasure and dolor for a unit
of pain. He cleverly developed a “hedonic calculus” based on these units.
He proposed to consider several aspects of pleasure:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Intensity—how strong is the pleasure (or pain)?
Duration—how long will the pleasure (or pain) last?
Certainty—how probable is it that one will experience the
pleasure (or pain)?
Propinquity—how long would one have to wait for the pleasure
(or pain)?
Fecundity—how likely is it that the pleasure (or pain) will breed
other pleasures (or pains)?
Purity—how unlikely is it that the pleasure will lead to pains
(or the pain to pleasures)?

To incorporate “the greatest number,” he added the distributive criterion:
7.

Extent—how many people will experience pleasure (or pain) as a
result?

Bentham proposed a basic moral decision procedure: (1) specify the alternative actions; (2) for each action, using the seven criteria, compute the
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total hedons and subtract the dolors to calculate the net pleasure; (3)
identify and do the optimific act, that is, the one that produces the greatest net pleasure.
It may be easy to imagine using this “calculus” in a rough-and-ready
way to make decisions. For example, Emily decides whether the pleasure of yet one more drink is worth the hangover that is likely to follow.
Tyrone decides whether the pain of paying for a swimming pool will
be worth the pleasure that he and his family will have. But this procedure is not really a calculus; it lacks crucial aspects. (1) Bentham never
really stated just what a single hedon or dolor is, nor did he explain an
adequate technique for measuring them. Clearly, he intended a subjective
measure, because he discussed factors that affect individual differences
in experiencing pain and pleasure; and he focused on actual pleasure
and pain, not an ideal calculation. But he gave us no way of determining just how many hedons Emily’s next drink would be, nor how many
dolors she could expect for her hangover. These terms are merely names
for units of pleasure and pain, not definitions. This is both a theoretical and a practical problem. (2) Bentham did not specify how the six
factors affecting pleasure are to be weighed in relation to each other.
How much low-grade, long-lasting pleasure equals an intense but brief
pleasure? How should we compare a mild pleasure that is certain to be
enjoyed tonight with an intense pleasure that is less certain and perhaps
a month away? And with regard to pain, is it, so to speak, better to pull
the Band-Aid off slowly with some pain, or to snatch it off rapidly but
with intense pain? (3) Bentham’s formulation requires two basic maximizations: the greatest pleasure and the greatest number. But these two
are independent, of course; they do not automatically increase in parallel. How should one weigh extent against pleasure? That is, how are we
to choose between a policy that would give a high number of net hedons
to a few individuals and a policy that would give a few net hedons to a
very large number of people? Bentham does not stipulate an answer.
Think just how complicated it would be to apply Bentham’s calculus
to the Project Prevention operation. Besides the pleasures and pains of
everyone affected, one has the additional problem of considering the
impact on “possible individuals”—infants who will never be born as a
result of their program.
The details of quantifying and measuring subjective states became the
work of later psychologists; the details of a calculus of utility were left to
later economists. But the vision of Bentham’s utilitarianism was clear if
not precise: actions, policies, and practices should be aimed at producing the greatest net good for the greatest number.
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6.4 JOHN STUART MILL
One of Bentham’s closest friends was James Mill, a Scottish philosopher,
historian, and public intellectual. When Mill’s wife delivered their first child,
a boy named John Stuart, Bentham became his godfather. Mill declared
that he would bring up this child to be a great advocate for utilitarianism, and his plan was shockingly successful. It helped that the boy was a
genius.11 But the education was rigorous: young Mill was homeschooled
under the demanding and restrictive tutelage of his father. The results
were astounding: he began Greek at the age of three; at eight, he learned
Latin. The list of works he had read by age thirteen is enormous, most in
the original languages. He would become one of the most influential philosophers of liberalism. But this intensive academic training unsurprisingly
took its toll. As Mill famously recounts in his Autobiography, when he was
twenty, he suffered a breakdown so severe that he contemplated suicide.
Yet he reasoned his way out of his depression: believing his emotional
development was stunted, he began reading Romantic poetry—taking
doses of poetry as though it was medicine—until he gradually recovered.
He became a staunch advocate of freedom and happiness.
His later biography is as fascinating as his early years. He was employed
by the East India Company for thirty-five years, rising in the ranks to
become responsible for all official correspondence with India—though
he never once visited the country. He fell in love with a married woman,
Harriet Taylor, a relationship that scandalized Victorian England, though
they eventually married. Harriet was a brilliant thinker and writer who
undoubtedly contributed to Mill’s work. Mill authored the greatest defense
of personal freedom ever penned: On Liberty. An opponent of slavery, he
wrote “On the Negro Question” in 1850 as a rebuttal to a racist essay by
the Scottish intellectual Thomas Carlyle. He was elected to Parliament,
where in 1867 he introduced the first legislation to grant women suffrage.
It failed. But in 1869, Mill wrote The Subjection of Women, a sustained argument for the equality of women. On these and many other social issues,
Mill is a subtle yet forceful thinker, a progressive who seems to read “the
right side of history.” His life and work comprise an exemplary utilitarian program.

6.5 QUALITATIVE HEDONISM
Mill first presented his classic account in a series of articles in Fraser’s
Magazine for Town and Country in 1861. They were reprinted in 1863 as a

Review Copy - Material Under Copyright
Chapter six: Utilitarianism

single text simply called Utilitarianism, and it has become a canonical
text in ethical theory. By the time it appeared, the doctrine of utilitarianism was both influential and controversial, and Mill wrote his essay to
explain and defend the doctrine. It may be read as a set of defensive and
persuasive responses to fourteen objections to the theory (unnumbered
in Mill’s text, but I have paraphrased them in Figure 2). He considers each
of the objections in turn, following an introductory chapter in which he
sets forth the problem to be addressed and his purpose.12 In the course of
his argument, Mill presents and refines Bentham’s “greatest happiness
principle” (a version of the Principle of Utility that names happiness as
the good), extending his account, discussing its implications, and portraying the quality of life the utilitarian seeks.
The first objection—utilitarianism rejects pleasure (Obj. 1)—Mill
dismisses as an “ignorant blunder.” The second, however—the claim that
it is base to reduce the human good to sensual pleasure (Obj. 2)—inspires
a response that introduces a significant and controversial amendment
to the theory. While Bentham had acknowledged different sources of
pleasure, Mill claims that “some kinds of pleasure are more desirable
and valuable than others.” This view is now called qualitative hedonism.
According to Mill, there is a hierarchy of pleasures in which “mental pleasures,” for example, are better, worthier, than sensual pleasures. Human
beings require and prefer pleasures that employ “their higher faculties.”
Mill writes:
Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the
lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast’s
pleasures; no intelligent person would consent to be a fool, no
instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and
conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be
persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied
with his lot than they are with theirs. They would not resign what
they possess more than he for the most complete satisfaction of all
the desires which they have in common with him.... It is better to be
a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates
dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a
different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the
question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides.13

There are three critical points to make about this remarkable explication. (1) One might initially think that Mill’s qualitative distinctions are
reducible to Bentham’s quantitative criteria, so there is nothing really
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FIGURE 2

MILL’S UTILITARIANISM

A SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED
Objections to Utilitarianism
Chapter 2
Obj. 1. Utilitarianism is opposed to pleasure.
Obj. 2. Utilitarians suppose that life has no higher end than pleasure—a base
doctrine “worthy only of swine.”
Obj. 3. Happiness cannot be the rational purpose of human life and action
because: (a) it is unattainable; (b) we are not entitled to happiness;
and (c) we can do without happiness.
Obj. 4. The utilitarian standard is beyond the reach of human beings: it is
expecting too much of people to require that they shall always act to
promote the general interests of society.
Obj. 5. Utilitarianism makes people “cold and unsympathizing”; it “chills their
moral feelings.”
Obj. 6. Utilitarianism is a godless doctrine.
Obj. 7. Utilitarianism replaces principled morality with expediency.
Obj. 8. Utilitarianism is impossible to practice because there is not sufficient
time, prior to acting, to calculate and weigh the possible effects of
several possible actions on the general happiness.
Obj. 9. People who practice utilitarianism will tend to make an exception for
themselves.
Chapter 3
Obj. 10. Utilitarianism has no natural sanction, no natural basis for its binding
force, its obligations, or its motives.
Chapter 4
Obj. 11. There is no proof of the Principle of Utility.
Obj. 12. Virtue is not regarded as a good by utilitarians.
Obj. 13. A virtuous person acts without any thought of the pleasure he or
she will receive in fulfilling obligations; at the very least, increasing
pleasures is not always the overriding motive of a virtuous person.
Chapter 5
Obj. 14. Utilitarianism cannot account for justice, because justice is opposed
to the expedient; justice is giving people what they deserve—not what
will make them happy.
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new here. Perhaps mental pleasures produce more hedons than sensual
pleasures because they are more enduring, fecund, and pure, for example. Although Mill accepts that argument, he goes further in this passage:
having the capacity for such pleasures is a good in itself. Indeed, it seems
to be a higher good than actual experiences of lower pleasures. Note
that Mill does not say “It is better to be a human being satisfied than a
pig satisfied”; he says “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a
pig satisfied.” If some pains are better than some pleasures, then a new
criterion has been introduced, a factor that makes qualitative distinctions among pleasures and pains. Pleasure is not the only good; perhaps
it is not even what ultimately governs the good. As the political philosopher Michael Sandel (b. 1953) has observed, “Mill saves utilitarianism from
the charge that it reduces everything to a crude calculus of pleasure and
pain, but only by invoking a moral ideal of human dignity and personality independent of utility itself.”14
(2) This view that pleasures, experiences, or activities form a hierarchy
of worthiness has been an influential tenet of Western culture since Plato.
It is largely based on such a doctrine that we have decided it is better to
teach physics or history in high school than billiards or basket-weaving.
But how are we to determine which of two pleasures or activities is the
higher or better? Mill proposes a superficially simple test: ask people who
are competent and experienced in both. If we are wondering whether, say,
rugby or poetry is the better activity, it will not help to ask people who
are fanatics for either rugby or poetry; rather, we must ask people who
are expert at both rugby and poetry. Only they are in a position to make
a valid comparison. Mill says, “The judgment of those who are qualified
by knowledge of both, or, if they differ, that of the majority among them,
must be admitted as final.”15
Some philosophers deny that any justification for such hierarchical
distinctions can be found. While there may be a basis to discriminate
good rugby play from bad, superior poems from inferior ones, these
skeptics argue there is no basis to judge poetry superior to rugby, or
vice versa.16 These distinctions of low and high activities are largely
a matter of personal prejudice, they say. In any event, most philosophers regard Mill’s test as a surprisingly silly proposal. (Imagine trying
to assemble the focus group of those rare individuals who are expert
in both rugby and poetry.) Nonetheless, Mill believes that judging the
quality of a pleasure to be gained from an activity requires knowledge
and direct experience of it, and he seems to believe also that people will
naturally converge in their judgments. So, although such judgments are
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subjective, they will naturally form a consensus—and that is the only
sort of test that is possible.
(3) The third point: a hint of circularity is present in Mill’s notion that we
are to consult people who are “susceptible to both classes of pleasures”
and defer to their judgments. But how could we identify individuals with
such a susceptibility or capability except by the actual judgments they
make? If someone familiar with both prefers rock-and-roll to opera, we
can always say she simply doesn’t appreciate the good of opera, she is
not really susceptible to its pleasures. It seems we must accept the judgments of experts, but can know them to be expert only by their judgments.
Mill’s shift to qualitative hedonism is reflected in his preference for
happiness as the good, though he retains its foundation in pleasures. The
concept of happiness he advocated is “not a life of rapture; but moments
of such, in an existence made up of few and transitory pains, many and
various pleasures, with a decided predominance of the active over the
passive, and having as the foundation of the whole, not to expect more
from life than it is capable of bestowing.”17 In Mill’s discussion, the concept
of happiness slides from a specific feeling to a broader, vaguer, more
inclusive concept of the positive quality of an enjoyed, flourishing life.
But the concept is not empty of meaning, nor is this range of meaning
illegitimate. Though Mill characterizes a life of happiness, he does not
imagine that individuals will find happiness in exactly the same activities or experiences. Some people love music; others love adventures in
nature; others develop a passion for chess. But these are sources of their
happiness—ultimately components of a happy life—and Mill’s liberalism
would never intentionally impose a notion of happiness that restricted
personal freedom. He believed we can acknowledge these important individual differences while still giving a substantive, general characterization
of happiness as the ultimate desire of all.

6.6 THE PROOF OF UTILITY
But is there any proof of the Principle of Utility (Obj. 11)? Is it possible to
prove that happiness—whatever the details may be—is the good? Although
Mill acknowledged that “ultimate ends do not admit of proof,” he does
offer the only sort of proof of which the Principle of Utility is “susceptible.” He asserts:
“The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is
that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is
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that people hear it.... In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence
it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people
do actually desire it ... No reason can be given why the general
happiness is desirable, except that each person ... desires his own
happiness. [Thus,] we have not only all the proof which the case
admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is
a good: that each person’s happiness is a good to that person, and
the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all
persons.”18

But Mill recognizes that the Principle of Utility requires more: it is
not enough to prove that happiness is a good; we need proof that it is
the good, the only good. Is it true that happiness is the only thing people
ultimately desire? Although individuals may variously value music or
adventure or virtue for itself, they desire it as a component of their happiness. Of course, Mill is aware that people may desire things that leave
them unhappy, and some souls may in fact choose a wretched life, but
he believes these choices are not rationally intelligible. Such choices can
only be explained by interpreting them as an irrational, misguided, or
perverted attempt to secure happiness.
Years later, the English philosopher G.E. Moore (1873–1958) objected to
this “proof” as linguistic sleight of hand. Moore noted that “visible” means
capable of being seen; “audible” means capable of being heard—but “desirable,” as Mill is using the term, does not mean capable of being desired; it
means worthy of being desired. Visible things and audible sounds are not
necessarily worthy of being seen or heard. The analogy is false.
But Mill may have been asserting ethical naturalism: his point may simply
be that moral values are grounded in human nature, and that it is human
nature to desire happiness. Thus, what is worth desiring will be a function of what humans by nature desire. His larger point is that genuinely
rational action always aims at the good as it is perceived; and happiness
is, by human nature, what all such action seeks—therefore happiness is
the good, the only good, or the all-embracing good.
One can easily understand the problem of proof that Mill faces: it is
the problem of proving intrinsic value. Imagine this scenario: a mother
getting ready to leave her house, patiently responding to the persistent
“why?” questions of her young daughter. “Why are you leaving now?”
To catch the bus. “Why are you taking the bus?” To get to work. “Why are
you going to work?” To earn money. “Why do you want money?” So that
I can pay for our rent and clothes and our toys and all the things we want
and need. “Why do you have to do all that?” So we’ll all be happy. “Why
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do you want to be happy?”—and at this point she stops. Because it’s good
to be happy. All of those intermediate steps—the bus, work, the money—
they are means to an end. They have value, but it is extrinsic value. Their
value is drawn from something extrinsic to them. When better means to
the same end appear, their value is diminished: if the mother buys a car,
she may no longer value the bus as much. But the end of this chain, happiness, has intrinsic value. It is good for its own sake, and is not selected
as a means to something else. We can prove extrinsic value by showing
it is an efficient means to a given end. But there is no proof outside itself
for something’s intrinsic value. Its value is recognized; it is self-justifying,
not justified by its usefulness in obtaining something else.19

6.7 FROM ACTS TO RULES
The utilitarian understands that when a moral agent is faced with a choice,
the actual consequences are never a certainty; and the further into the
future we consider our actions’ effects, the less certain we are of them.
Therefore, the agent’s calculation is to be made in terms of reasonable
expectations as to outcomes. Certainly, an agent can be blamed for miscalculating, for ignoring relevant considerations, or for basing an action on
unreasonable prospects. But although some would insist on a review of
eventual actual consequences to evaluate the act, everyone would expect
the agent only to do what would reasonably be judged optimific given the
best information at the time.
Still, one might argue that utilitarianism seems to require so much of
moral agents as to be impossible to comply in practice. First, there are
the issues of attention and time. It seems to require continual calculation,
because any act is wrong if there is an alternative that would have more
utility. But often there is not sufficient time to weigh possible effects on
the general happiness of innumerable possible actions (Obj. 8). It requires
a vigorous and perceptive moral imagination to frame all of one’s alternatives. In addition, utilitarianism seems to be unreasonably demanding.
It sets the highest and best possible action—always doing the utmost to
promote the greatest good—as the minimum standard for moral behavior
(Obj. 4). This is simply beyond the reach of human beings. Since one has a
duty to do the optimific act, there is no possibility of going beyond duty
for extraordinary good; that is, supererogation is eliminated. Moreover,
there is no respite from the demands of morality, since a good utilitarian, it seems, should calculate every action, indeed every possible action,
at every moment.
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Utilitarianism puts the agent in an unmanageable predicament. Imagine
that Cynthia has $1,000 in the bank. She may be going about her business, not thinking about her savings—but, as a utilitarian, she should
be. Should she keep the money there to let her savings grow? Or should
she pay a debt with it? Or should she spend it for something that would
bring her joy? Or perhaps she should divide it among ten needy friends?
Should she lend it to someone in need? Or should she send it to any one
of a hundred charities—maybe disaster relief or sponsorship of children? Which of these would be the optimific act producing the greatest
good for the greatest number? All this calculation is so exhausting as to
be impossible; yet anything less than the optimific act would be wrong—
and Cynthia was not thinking she faced an ethical decision at all. But she
should also be thinking of the good she could do with her car or by acting
as a helpful volunteer instead of using her savings. This swirling sense of
possibilities for promoting happiness would fill her waking moments—in
fact, she should also consider how much good she could do if she reduced
her sleeping hours. A diligent utilitarian, it seems, is likely to experience
both moral and physical (and perhaps financial) exhaustion.20
Furthermore, a utilitarian moral agent must face this predicament
without any fixed ethical principles, beyond the injunction to promote
the greatest good. She has no moral standard for choosing the means to
an end; indeed, no means are prohibited; the expedient action is taken
to be the right action (Obj. 7). Justice, for example, normally a powerful
moral ideal, does not serve as a moral touchstone; it is waved in favor of
expediency (Obj. 14). Consider these cases:
A. The sheriff knows that a murder was committed by an unknown
assailant who quickly left the country, and there is no chance
to apprehend him. But there is a dangerous man, a local man,
innocent of this murder, but tied to other killings. The sheriff
plants evidence that implicates this man and finally leads
to his imprisonment. He reasons that it promotes the social
good, calming the fears of citizens by “solving” a murder, and
protecting the public by putting a dangerous and otherwise
guilty criminal behind bars.
B. Members of an isolated commune determine that the optimific
arrangement would require that one of them become a slave
to the others. They correctly calculate that, although the
negative costs to the slave would be significant, they would
be outweighed by the good enjoyed by others. They decide to
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determine who will be the slave by having the least specialized
team members draw lots.
Even if the greatest happiness is in fact produced in both cases, one might
ask, “But what about justice?” Is it just to frame a man for a crime he didn’t
commit or to enslave someone at random for the benefits to others? Or
is justice, like natural rights, a nonsensical restraint on doing the most
good?
In part, these and similar objections and scenarios arise because of the
focus on actions. What I called the vanilla version of the theory, its purest
version, is known as act utilitarianism. Recall that it asserts:
“X is the right act” = “X is the optimific act”

Mill gradually pulls away from this straightforward act utilitarianism.
He moves toward what is now called rule utilitarianism.21 This is a more
complex form of the theory, which asserts:
“X is the right act” = “X is prescribed by one of a set of rules, which,
if followed, would produce the greatest good for the greatest
number”

The relevant calculation of maximal utility thus shifts from individual
acts to rules or principles. Under rule utilitarianism, the situation of the
moral agent becomes more manageable: one is not faced with evaluating all possible actions at every moment; instead, one follows rules that
have been tested for on-the-whole utility-production. Mill’s answer to the
“insufficient time” objection (Obj. 7) is that “there has been ample time,
namely, the whole past duration of the human species.” The received rules
we have learned are continually tested in human experience, however. As
Mill says, “The corollaries from the principle of utility, like the precepts of
every practical art, admit of indefinite improvement, and in a progressive
state of the human mind, their improvement is perpetually going on.”22
As to justice, which Mill regards as “the only real difficulty in the utilitarian theory of morality,” he claims “Justice is a name for certain moral
requirements, which, regarded collectively, stand higher in the scale of
social utility, and are therefore of more paramount obligation, than any
others.”23 This talk of “corollaries,” “precepts,” and “requirements” suggests
a recognition of moral principles, yet Mill seems to claim that, although
an agent may start from a stock of moral rules and apply available moral

Review Copy - Material Under Copyright
Chapter six: Utilitarianism

principles in reasoning, nevertheless, in the end the decision comes down
to the utility of individual acts. He says:
“Particular cases may occur in which some other social duty is so
important, as to overrule any one of the general maxims of justice.
Thus, to save a life, it may not only be allowable but a duty to steal
or take by force the necessary food or medicine, or to kidnap and
compel to officiate the only qualified medical practitioner. In such
cases ... we usually say, not that justice must give way to some other
moral principle, but that what is just in ordinary cases is, by reason
of that other principle, not just in the particular case. By this useful
accommodation of language ... we are saved from the necessity of
maintaining that there can be laudable injustice.... It has always
been evident that all cases of justice are also cases of expediency.”24

Nonetheless, it seems that Mill has introduced another hierarchy: apparently there is a “scale of social utility” in which some requirements stand
lower while others, like justice, stand higher; and the higher carry greater
moral obligation. The explication of Mill’s system seems to require three
types or tiers of rules or principles: (1) Basic are the ethical rules we learn
from common experience, like Don’t kill or inflict pain needlessly, or Don’t
lie, cheat, or steal. These are tested, morally useful rules. But sometimes
they may conflict. (2) To resolve such situations, we need rules about rules;
that is, we need principles that prioritize the rules: Life is more important than property, or Justice outweighs the benefits gained by enslavement.
But even these cannot resolve every moral situation one may encounter.
(3) When no rule applies, we turn to the master rule (sometimes called
“the remainder rule”), which is act utilitarianism: Do what you reasonably
expect to produce the greatest good for the greatest number.
There is an important and complex issue that hides in Mill’s discussion.
If one claims that each and every morally right act must maximize utility, even acts involving justice or other moral principles, rules are at best
a shorthand guide to what is right. Rules have no special status and rule
utilitarianism is then fully reducible to act utilitarianism. Perpetual background calculation of individual acts is still required. But if it is the rules
that have a utility independent of individual acts, if we turn to calculating the utility of individual acts only when our tiers of rules fail to resolve
a problematic situation, then act utilitarianism is only a failsafe, a last
resort. Rule utilitarianism is not then reducible to a straightforward act
utilitarianism. But this entails that we may find ourselves in situations in
which we are obliged to follow a rule that has great utility, despite the fact
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that in our current situation, it is not optimific. It suggests that following
judicious rules may do more good over the long haul than trying to do
the most good in each and every situation. But how then can we test and
assure the utility of a rule? To put the critical question simply: when it is
pressed to the extreme, must rule utilitarianism either transform into a
deontological theory or collapse into act utilitarianism?
Project Prevention, our opening case, runs on rule utilitarianism: it
has general policies—a $300 stipend paid in cash, traded for sterilization,
only offered to addicts, and so on—which are justified, it claims, by their
utility. These policies work for the greater good. But one could imagine
a case that fit all the policies, but in which the prospects were not good.
In such a situation, one would ask: is it better to follow the policies which
have high utility (rule utilitarianism), or to resort to a case-by-case judgment (act utilitarianism)?
The interpretation of rule utilitarianism and the status of moral rules
remain controversial to this day—even among committed advocates. Some
have proposed that it is best to apply the test of utility to practices rather
than rules or acts. We would therefore test the practice of slavery for the
production of the greatest good for the greatest number, not a particular
case or rule; the practice of paying addicts for sterilization, rather than
a particular exchange. This has predictably been called practice utilitarianism. And most of the same questions of interpretation raised with rule
utilitarianism would apply to this form as well.

6.8 THE ADEQUACY AND IMPACT OF UTILITARIANISM
The previous discussion has identified problems with utilitarianism that
challenge its adequacy as a moral theory—at least according to some critics. These include the ambiguity of key concepts, the practical tasks for
moral agency, a level of expectation so demanding it leaves no room for
supererogation, and the contested status of moral rules and principles.
Beyond these issues internal to the theory, many critics have pointed
out that this approach gives no place to moral sentiments or emotions.
The moral agent is, much like Mill himself in his early years, a dispassionate, rational calculator. Even in Mill’s day, the doctrine was thought to be
“cold and unsympathizing” (Obj. 5). Contributing to this assessment is a
related issue: the flat impartiality of the calculations. Normal human beings
develop strong emotional ties, close relations, with family and friends,
but utilitarians take no count of these relationships. Since each and every
person counts as one, I have no reason to privilege the goodness for my
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children or my spouse or parents over those of distant people unknown
to me. Indeed, it would be wrong for me to be more concerned about my
daughter than a stranger, to choose her goodness over theirs. But partiality to ourselves and those we love, along with the emotions connected to
care and compassion, are deeply embedded aspects of moral life.
What this criticism reveals is that the natural home of utilitarian thinking is the domain of ethical social policy—issues such as health care and
criminal punishment. It fits well the considerations of military policy, the
corporate boardroom, and the legislature. Its concern for the greatest
good is directed toward the greatest number of individuals, but these are
individuals abstracted to a number, without consideration of their individuality, without any nod to special relationships among them.
Utilitarian theory does appear to harmonize all dimension of one’s
life (though with the austerity noted above), giving us one principle by
which to act in all situations. But some critics have argued the utilitarianism may enjoin a person to violate their integrity. Imagine this case:
Josh, an employee of an American corporation working in the
Middle East is kidnapped by terrorists and brought to a camp
where about twenty-five men, women, and children are captive. He
learns that these prisoners will soon be executed by their captors,
their murders to be publicized to stoke fear and recruit others willing to kill. Josh, an unexpected American hostage, is a prize and
will not be killed, but will be traded for weapons. But he is given a
choice: he will be given a gun, and if he will select and kill one of the
prisoners, all the others will be spared and released; if he declines,
they will all be executed as planned. The prisoners overhear this
bargain and besiege him to accept the bargain.25

The act of highest utility is clear: Josh is morally obligated to choose and
kill a prisoner. Critics like Bernard Williams (1929–2003), claim that utilitarian calculation may, as in this situation, compel us to abandon our most
cherished beliefs and principles, to destroy our integrity. In dire cases
such as this, someone else (the terrorist captor) has structured a situation into which a moral agent (Josh) is thrust, disrupting the agent’s own
projects and plans, values and choices. It is another (malevolent) agent
that has established the architecture of choices, not Josh. Utilitarians
may argue that “integrity” is being used as a name for a set of principles
that are held without regard to consequences. A true utilitarian finds the
decision simple (though serious) and feels no loss of integrity in saving
many lives by taking one—just as Mill says we experience no loss of justice
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when theft or kidnap is necessary to save a life. But surely this is not just
“another problem solved.” We would find something wrong with Josh if that
were his response. There is little doubt that a strictly utilitarian approach
would sometimes require us to ignore traditional moral touchstones.
The British philosopher and Nobel laureate, Bertrand Russell, was
the godson of John Stuart Mill. He wrote an essay in the 1920s called
“The Harm that Good Men Do,” in which he said, “A hundred years ago
there lived a philosopher named Jeremy Bentham, who was universally
recognised to be a very wicked man.... I ... discovered what was the really
serious charge against him. It was no less than this: that he defined a
‘good’ man as a man who does good.” Mill himself described Bentham as
“the great subversive.” These quotations relish the utilitarian’s posture
as one who rejects the constraints of received, authoritative morality in
favor of empirical results, or reasonable expectations of them. For Russell,
much of the harm done in the world was done by people who claimed to
be acting in accord with morality, but were heedless of the actual consequences of their actions.
Enlightenment liberalism represents, in part, a rejection of any morality that is directed toward virtuous fitness for a life after death in favor of
personal fulfillment and social progress in this life. Resisting the egoistic
preoccupation that may accompany the individualism of the Enlightenment,
utilitarianism reaches outward to society and forward to the future and
our descendants. One of its attractions to me is the ethical vividness it
imparts to the consequences of our actions for future generations. There
is, though, little guidance from utilitarian theorists regarding the timeframe we are to use in considering consequences. Consider a policy for the
fossil fuel industry that benefits those now alive, saving jobs and reducing costs, while ignoring climate change and resource depletion problems
for future generations. Does it have more “visible” utility than one that
addresses climate change but requires hardships now? This issue of near
versus far term, of those now alive versus future generations is a matter
of the purview of our moral interest, and it is a problem for all forms of
consequentialism (as we saw with egoism and its “enlightened” varieties).
Concern with this life, rather than a life after death, can too often truncate
to a concern only with the here and now or the near future.
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QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
1 Is Project Prevention doing morally good work? (Reviewing the
material cited in notes 1–3 may be helpful in reaching a considered
judgment.)
2 Bentham lists “propinquity” (nearness in time) as one of the
measures of pleasure, presumably valuing an immediate pleasure
more than one in the future. Psychologists have demonstrated
our natural tendency to do this, but they call it “discounting the
future” and consider it a cognitive bias—a minor but predictable
irrationality. Yet “deferred gratification” is also considered a mark
of maturity. Is it valid to discount future rewards? (Remember
the issue is not uncertainty—Bentham lists certainty as a
separate criterion.) Would propinquity remove concern for future
generations?
3 Explain why is it “better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig
satisfied”? If Mill has smuggled in a good other than pleasure, what
is it?
4 Refute this claim: Watching or playing rugby and reading or writing
poetry are equally worthwhile activities, and so are poker and
physics.
5 “Utilitarians cannot protect the rights of individuals.” Explain why
this claim is plausible. Do you agree with it, or can a sophisticated
utilitarian give an adequate reply?
6 A familiar case for utilitarian analysis is this: Would you torture a
terrorist to discover the location of a bomb set to detonate within
hours? But what if the terrorist, the one who placed the bomb, was
a thirteen-year-old?
7 Explain why act utilitarianism makes supererogation impossible.
8 Lifeboat cannibalism: After a devastating gale, a crew of men
endured nearly three dreadful weeks in a 13-foot lifeboat. They
debated drawing lots for a sacrificial victim, some noting that it
would be better for one to die so the others could have a chance
to survive. Some pointed out they had wives and families at
home; others were single. The next day, however, the cabin boy,
Parker, fell into a coma. Taking matters into his own hands, a man
named Dudley said a prayer and then killed Parker with a knife.
The remaining men then drank his blood and ate his flesh. They
thus survived for several days more when a ship was sighted and
rescued them. Did Dudley do the right thing? [This is the case of
Regina vs. Dudley and Stephens (1884), a famous British case.]
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QUESTIONS FOR PERSONAL REFLECTION
1 Mill claims that due to the psychology of association, means to the
end of happiness can, over time, become components of happiness
itself: if playing tennis makes me happy, it can become true that a
happy life for me must include tennis. What are the components of
a happy life for you?
2 Consider this claim: “There is not one moral principle, however
compelling, that could not properly be overridden or violated in
certain circumstances.”
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NOTES
1 Unless given special citation, the facts, figures, and quotations in
this case are drawn from the Project Prevention website: http://
projectprevention.org/ (accessed July 2018).
2 Jon Swaine, “Drug addict sterilised for cash—but can Barbara
Harris save our babies?” The Daily Telegraph. October 19, 2010:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/health/8071664/Drug-addictsterilised-for-cash-but-can-Barbara-Harris-save-our-babies.html
(accessed July 2018).
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3 See the discussion of the evolution of Ms. Harris’s comments on
Wikipedia at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_Prevention
(accessed July 2018).
4 Quoted in Swaine, “Drug addict sterilised for cash.”
5 For a history of utilitarianism, see Bart Shulz, The Happiness
Philosophers: The Lives and Works of the Great Utilitarians
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 2017).
6 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (1907), Book III, Chapter
xiii.4, 382.
7 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
Legislation, Chapter XVII, Section 1.iv, n. 122.
8 Images of the auto-icon abound on the Internet, but University
College London has developed a high-resolution, rotating image
of it at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/Bentham-Project/who/autoicon/
Virtual_Auto_Icon.
9 The panopticon is a design for a prison that has cells arranged in a
circle around a well or tower, from which guards could observe all
prisoners at all times.
10 This requirement and the assumption that it can be achieved is
given the technical term aggregationism.
11 His name is regularly found on lists of individuals with startlingly
high IQs.
12 I cannot discuss every one of these objections and rebuttals, but
my discussion includes a brief examination of many of them.
13 Mill, Utilitarianism, Chapter 2.
14 Michael J. Sandel, Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do? (New
York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2009), 56.
15 Mill, Utilitarianism, Chapter 2.
16 For example, see Oliver Letwin, Ethics, Emotion and the Unity of
the Self (New York: Routledge, 2010), Chapter 2, “High Activities
and Low Activities.”
17 Mill, Utilitarianism, Chapter 2.
18 Ibid., Chapter 4.
19 We might imagine an eccentric person for whom riding the bus
was an intrinsically wonderful experience, not a means to get
anywhere in particular. But then the same problem of proof would
apply to bus riding as an end-in-itself.
20 I will return to this problem of the demands of morality in
Chapter 14.
21 This is evident especially in his response to the objections about
the impossible predicament of moral agency, and in his treatment
of justice, to which he devotes a lengthy final chapter.
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22 Ibid., Chapter 2.
23 Ibid., Chapter 5.
24 Ibid.
25 I have adapted this case from one developed by Bernard Williams
in “A Critique of Utilitarianism”; in Utilitarianism: For and Against,
ed. J.J.C. Smart and Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge UP,
1973), 98–99.

